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Fees

Four kinds of protocol fees: borrow interest, the branch redemption fee, the redemption protocol fee, and the early-repayment fee. They have different destinations.

This page traces all four. To start with the rewards rather than the routing, see Earn RD and Earn MOAI.

Fee flow at a glance​

The protocol's main ongoing revenue is borrow interest, paid in RD by every open trove. Two smaller RD fees join it at the GlobalFeeRouter: the 0.25% redemption protocol fee and the 2% early-repayment fee on debt repaid within 6 hours of the trove's last debt increase. In normal operation this revenue is split four ways — and three of those four are places you can earn.

Borrow interest from all branches (RD)GlobalFeeRouter+ redemption protocol & early-repayment feesStability Poolsdeposit RD to earnKeeper rewardsMEV botsLP stakingprovide liquidityMOAI stakingstake MOAI
Normal operation: borrow interest (in RD) from every branch is split between the branches' local Stability Pools and the singleton GlobalFeeRouter, which also receives the 0.25% redemption protocol fee and early-repayment fees (both in RD) and fans out to keeper rewards, LP staking, and MOAI staking. Band widths are illustrative; the Stability Pool and LP splits are set by PI controllers within a 10%–60% band at launch, with both floors rising to 35% as MOAI emissions taper. Branch redemption fees are not shown — they stay with the redeemed trove.

Where the fees go​

  1. Stability Pools — each branch's pool takes a share of that branch's interest (10%–60%, set by its utilization controller), folded straight into depositors' RD balances, on top of the collateral gains and MOAI emissions depositors already earn. You earn by depositing RD into a branch's pool.
  2. LP staking — a share of the global distribution, paid as RD, on top of the MOAI emissions LPs earn. You earn by providing liquidity to the RD/USDC or RD/USDT Uniswap v4 pool and staking your LP shares.
  3. MOAI staking — the remainder of the global distribution, paid to MOAI stakers as RD. You earn by staking MOAI (longer lockup tiers take a bigger share).
  4. Keeper rewards — a small top-up that funds protocol upkeep: whenever the KeeperRewards balance drops below 500 RD, it is refilled to 1,000 RD before anything else is paid. This one is a MEV-centric sink: keeper bots earn RD for performing the on-chain operations the protocol needs — running drips, updating the controller (rate and par), and shutting down branches that meet a shutdown condition. It's competitive and automated rather than a passive deposit; run a bot and you can capture it, otherwise it just keeps the machine turning.

The Stability Pool and LP shares are set by PI controllers and move inside a 10%–60% band at launch; both floors rise to 35% as MOAI emissions taper, so MOAI stakers receive what is left. While a shut-down branch has bad debt, up to half of the MOAI-staker share is used to repay it. The exact routing is below. Branch redemption fees are a separate stream not shown above — they stay with the redeemed trove as residual collateral and never reach these destinations (see Redemption).

Multi-branch protocol flow​

The Normal operation view is the everyday flow: each branch's FeeRouter splits borrow interest between its local Stability Pool and GlobalFeeRouter, which also receives the RD-denominated fees (the redemption protocol fee and early-repayment fees) and fans out to keeper rewards, LP fees, and MOAI staking. Widths are illustrative; in live operation each split moves inside its controller bounds ([10%, 60%] at launch, with both floors rising to 35% as MOAI emissions taper).

The Bad-debt repair view shows the temporary diversion while a branch is undercollateralized: UNDERCOLLATERALIZED_FRAC = 50% of the MOAI-staker allocation, plus branch redemption fees charged in RD and a 0.5% bad-debt surcharge on redemptions, are routed to the sink branch's payDebt(...). The LP share is computed first and paid in full — only MOAI stakers are diluted during repair. Once the sink branch is repaid, normal flow resumes.

Branch redemption fees do not enter the routers in normal operation; they are retained by the redeemed trove (see "Redemption-fee path" below). The only exception is the bad-debt-sink case, in which the redemption fee feeds the dotted path along with the staker diversion.

What gets charged, and where it goes​

FeeCharged inDestination
Borrow interestRDAccrued continuously via InterestEngine drips into trove debt. Routed through FeeRouter and GlobalFeeRouter to the Stability Pool, keeper rewards, LP fees, MOAI staking, and (when active) bad-debt repayment.
Branch redemption feeBranch collateral0.75% on every branch at deployment (each branch's rate is fixed at deployment, within the contract bounds of 0.5%–2.5%). Retained by the redeemed trove as residual collateral. Does not flow to the routers; does not reach MOAI stakers. The only exception is the bad-debt sink case (see below).
Redemption protocol feeRD0.25% of the RD actually redeemed, charged on top of every normal redemption (the redeemer must hold the requested amount plus the fee). It is burned from the redeemer and the same amount is routed through GlobalFeeRouter (keeper rewards, LP fees, MOAI staking, bad-debt repayment). It does not go to the Stability Pools. Shutdown-branch redemptions do not charge it.
Early-repayment feeRD2% of the principal repaid within 6 hours of the trove's last debt increase (EARLY_REPAY_FEE_BPS, EARLY_REPAY_WINDOW), on repayment or close, before or after shutdown. Routed by the branch FeeRouter to GlobalFeeRouter in full, bypassing the Stability Pool.

There is no upfront borrow fee (Liquity v1 had one; this protocol does not). The borrow rate accrues continuously instead.

Borrow-interest path​

This is the path that produces most staker income.

Stage 1: branch FeeRouter​

Each branch has a FeeRouter. When the branch's InterestEngine accrues interest, it hands the amount to the router. The router:

  1. Sends a fraction to the branch's local StabilityPool (folded into deposit balances, growing depositor RD without their action). If the pool has no deposits, nothing is sent to it.
  2. Leaves the rest for the singleton GlobalFeeRouter (forwarded directly on a single-branch drip, or once per batch by the Aggregator on a multi-branch drip).

The SP split adapts to SP utilization:

SP_utilization = stability_pool_balance / branch_debt (each sample capped at 100%)
target = 25%
deadband = 3%
allocation_bound = [10%, 60%] at launch; the floor rises to 35% as MOAI emissions taper
bias = 50%
half-life of EMA = 72 hours

If SP utilization is above target (the pool is large relative to debt; depositors are over-supplied), the router routes less to the SP and more to the GlobalFeeRouter. If SP utilization is below target (the pool is thin; risk of unhandled liquidation), the router routes more to the SP, growing depositor balances faster and incentivizing fresh deposits.

The PI gains:

kp = 0.5
timeConstant = 3 × half-life = 9 days
ki = kp / timeConstant
max dt per update = 12 hours

Slow but steady. The router does not whipsaw the SP split day-to-day. Initial spAllocFrac output is the 50% bias.

The allocation floor (minAllocationFrac()) follows the MOAI emission schedule: it stays at 10% through the peak emission month (month 12), then rises month by month in proportion to the decline in monthly MOAI issuance, reaching 35% when emissions end. While depositors earn MOAI, more interest can flow to MOAI stakers; once emissions stop, more of it stays with the venues.

60%50%10%target 25% · ±3% deadband→ GlobalFeeRouterLP · MOAI stakers · keeper→ Stability Pooldepositor yieldthin pool → 60%over-supplied → 10%0%25%50%SP utilization = SP balance ÷ branch debt →
Every branch's FeeRouter splits accrued interest between its local Stability Pool and the singleton GlobalFeeRouter, using a PI controller on a 72-hour EMA of SP utilization = SP balance ÷ branch debt. Inside the ±3% deadband around the 25% target it holds at the 50% bias; outside it ramps the SP share toward 60% (thin pool) or its floor (over-supplied): 10% at launch, rising to 35% as MOAI emissions taper. The complement flows on to keeper rewards, LP fees and MOAI staking.

Stage 2: GlobalFeeRouter​

The singleton GlobalFeeRouter receives the cross-branch share of interest plus the RD fees. For each batch it is told the gross fee amount and the part still undistributed, and splits the latter in this order:

  1. Keeper rewards. First claim. If KeeperRewards holds less than 500 RD, the router refills it toward 1,000 RD.
  2. LP fees. lpAllocFrac × the gross fee amount (including the part already sent to Stability Pools), capped by what remains after the keeper top-up. lpAllocFrac is controlled by a PI loop on LP utilization. Paid to LpFeeDistributor, which splits it equally between the LP staking contracts of the two pools that are not shut down.
  3. MOAI staking. The remainder, to MOAI stakers (across all tiers), as RD.
  4. Bad-debt repayment. If the Aggregator has designated a currentUnderCollateralizedTM, half of the MOAI-staker share is offered to that branch's debt before distribution. The LP share is not touched.

Because the LP share is a fraction of gross fees, the SP and LP splits together decide how much is left for MOAI stakers: with both at their 35% terminal floors, MOAI stakers receive at most 30% of fees.

The staker share is paid only when it is at least 1 RD and some MOAI is staked; otherwise it is carried forward. The LP share is carried forward while no LP tokens are staked. If both market pools have permanently shut down, the LP share (including anything carried forward) goes to MOAI staking instead.

Keeper rewards​

keeperRewardsTargetBalance = 1,000 RD
keeperRewardsMinBalance = 500 RD

If the KeeperRewards RD balance drops below the minimum, the router refills it up to the target before anything else is paid. The KeeperRewards contract pays keepers for drips, controller updates and branch shutdowns: the drip reward is 2% of the interest banked since the last rewarded drip, scaled by a cubic ramp between 3 and 8 hours; the controller-update reward ramps cubically up to UPDATE_MAX_REWARD = 60 RD; a shutdown pays 100 RD per branch, up to 400 RD per call. Every payout is capped by the contract's RD balance.

LP vs MOAI split​

The same PI-controlled allocation pattern, with different targets:

target_LP_utilization = 12.5%
deadband = 1%
allocation_bound = [10%, 60%] at launch; the floor rises to 35% as MOAI emissions taper
bias = 50%
kp = 0.7
ki = kp / (3 × 72h)
max dt per update = 12 hours

LP_utilization = pool liquidity TWAL / RD total supply: the lower of the market oracle's 24-hour and 4-hour liquidity TWALs, summed over the RD/USDC and RD/USDT pools that are not shut down, divided by rdToken.totalSupply(). Each sample is capped at 37.5% (three times the target); if the 4-hour liquidity is below the oracle's 500,000 RD-equivalent floor, the sample counts as 0% utilization. The protocol wants roughly 12.5% of RD supply held as liquidity in the RD market pools. If it's lower, LP gets more incentive; if higher, LP gets less. The same LP-utilization EMA also feeds the peg controller's liquidity authority (see Peg control).

60%50%10%target 12.5% · ±1% deadband→ MOAI stakersremainder, as RD→ LP stakingLP stakers in both pools, as RDthin LP → 60%deep LP → 10%0%12.5%25%LP utilization = pool liquidity (TWAL) ÷ RD supply →
After the keeper top-up, the GlobalFeeRouter splits what's left between LP fees and MOAI staking using a PI controller on a 72-hour EMA of LP utilization = pool liquidity ÷ RD total supply. Inside the ±1% deadband around the 12.5% target it holds at the 50% bias; outside it ramps the LP share toward 60% (thin LP) or its floor (deep LP): 10% at launch, rising to 35% as MOAI emissions taper. The complement goes to MOAI stakers.

The rest goes to MOAI stakers, distributed in proportion to stake × tier multiplier (1.0×, 1.15× or 1.5× while the position's lock is active). See MOAI staking.

Bad-debt repayment​

UNDERCOLLATERALIZED_FRAC = 50%

When a branch has bad debt, 50% of the MOAI-staker share (availForDebt = st × UNDERCOLLATERALIZED_FRAC) is offered to Aggregator.payDebt(...) for the sink branch; whatever payDebt actually consumes is deducted, and MOAI stakers receive the rest. The LP allocation is computed and paid before the diversion and is never diluted (GlobalFeeRouter._distributePending).

This is an automated bad-debt-repayment path that requires no admin top-up. While a sink branch has debt, the protocol routes these fee flows toward repair; whether and how quickly the debt is fully repaid depends on future fee and redemption volume.

Redemption-fee path​

Branch redemption fees don't flow through the routers at all. In the redemption lot math, collateralFee is the "fee retained by the trove."

Mechanically:

gross_collateral_drawn = (redeemed_rd / oracle_price) × par
fee_in_collateral = gross_collateral_drawn × redemption_fee (rounded up)
collateral_to_redeemer = gross_collateral_drawn − fee_in_collateral

The trove's debt decreases by the full redeemed_rd. The trove's collateral decreases by only collateral_to_redeemer. The fee portion stays inside the trove as residual collateral, raising the trove's post-redemption ICR.

Why this design: it rewards borrowers for staying above the redemption frontier. A borrower whose trove gets partially redeemed against ends up with less debt and an improved ICR, partially compensated for the inconvenience of being chosen.

Separately, the redeemer pays the 0.25% redemption protocol fee in RD on top of the redeemed amount; that fee goes to GlobalFeeRouter, not to the trove.

Exception: bad-debt sink​

There is one path where the redemption fee does flow rather than being retained. When the Aggregator has designated a currentUnderCollateralizedTM (a sink branch with bad debt), every redemption on healthy branches:

  • Charges the branch redemption fee in RD instead of collateral: the RD sent to each branch is reduced by the fee rate, and the fee slice is routed to the sink branch's payDebt(...).
  • Adds a bad-debt surcharge of BAD_DEBT_REDEEM_FRAC = 0.5%, also routed to payDebt(...), for which the redeemer receives no collateral.

Both are capped by the sink's remaining debt, because payDebt stops at the debt still outstanding. The redeemer's RD is burned for the redeemed amount, the debt actually repaid, and the 0.25% protocol fee.

So in the bad-debt-sink case, the redemption fee funds protocol solvency repair. In the normal case, it stays with the borrower. Either way, the branch redemption fee never flows to MOAI stakers.

See Redemption mechanism for the full bad-debt flow.

Why two stages and two PI loops on the borrow path​

  • Per-branch SP utilization is local. A branch's SP can be over- or under-supplied independently. Putting the SP allocator on the branch's FeeRouter lets each branch tune its own SP incentives.
  • LP utilization is global. The RD market pools serve every branch, and the oracle reports one combined liquidity number. So the LP allocator lives on the singleton GlobalFeeRouter.
  • Decoupling. SP and LP utilization move for different reasons. Separating them makes the controllers independently tunable without one's noise feeding into the other's loop.

Where to dig deeper​